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Abstract  
The global financial crisis dragged many countries into recession, demonstrated that the international 
financial system has structural problems and started discussions about restructuring of the international financial 
institutions. The main objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of the global financial crisis on the 
governance structures of the international financial institutions. To this end, studies made at different international 
platforms were evaluated. The debates and negotiations among the developed and developing countries about 
governance structures of the international financial institutions were analyzed. Developing countries’ demand to 
reform the decision-making mechanisms of the Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and the World Bank and 
developed countries’ reservations were investigated. It was concluded that the new shape of the international 
financial architecture and governance structures of international financial institutions will depend on international 
politics as well as the evolution of the global crisis and the economic dynamics. 
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I. Introduction 
In recent years there has been a pressure 
from At the Bretton Woods Conferences in 1944, 
international monetary system was determined as 
adjustable peg system tied to the U.S. dollar and 
gold, the IMF and the World Bank were established, 
and the Bretton Woods System was constituted. 
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in 
1971; volatility in exchange rates, technological 
innovation, which has accelerated economic 
integration through virtual and physical time-space 
compression (Harvey, 1989), and financial 
liberalization reforms, which led to an increase in 
levels of capital account openness and financial 
openness, (Walter and Sen, 2008: 122) increased 
and accelerated international capital movements and 
many developed and developing countries entered 
into financial crises. 
The global financial crisis, which started in 
the U.S., is the last and the largest of these crises. 
Because of the degree of globalization in financial 
markets, global crisis quickly spread to other 
countries. (Yunus, 2009: 6) The globalization of 
capital has been an integral part of the scale of the 
financial crisis. (Legg and Harris, 2009: 369) The 
global crisis started discussions about the 
restructuring of the international financial system. 
Some scholars argue that significant transnational 
regulatory initiatives will advance as a result of the 
financial crisis. In the contrary, some scholars think 
the crisis is generating a reassertion of state 
authority over international financial markets. 
(Helleiner, 2009a:1) Nonetheless, it is generally 
accepted that international financial architecture, 
which is likened to oil in our cars that lubricates the 
engine of world growth (El-Arian, 2009:88), is far 
from preventing crises.  
The developed countries, particularly the 
G-7 countries and the developing countries, 
particularly the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China) tried to shape the restructuring 
process of the international financial system and the 
international financial institutions according to their 
interests. Divergence between the perspectives of 
developed and developing countries transformed the 
restructuring process into a political process. It is 
expected that besides accelerating the restructuring 
of the international financial system, the financial 
crisis will have geopolitical reflections (Burrows 
and Harris, 2009) and the international balance of 
power will find a new equilibrium because of the 
crisis. (Germain, 2009) This paper aims to 
investigate the impact of the global financial crisis 
on the governance structures of the international 
financial institutions within context of international 
politics. The article proceeds in the following 
manner. First, impact of the global financial crisis 
on the restructuring of the international financial 
system is examined. In the second section, role of 
the G-20 summits and international politics on the 
restructuring process is analyzed. In the third 
section, restructuring of the international financial 
institutions’ governance is evaluated. 
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II. THE GLOBAL CRISIS 
AND  THE 
INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
The biggest financial crisis since the Great 
Depression, which originated in the US and spread 
quickly to other countries, clearly demonstrated that 
the U.S. and international financial architecture has 
structural flaws so that this is not just a crisis in the 
system, this is a crisis of the system. The crisis was 
a challenge; the three of the most seemingly 
effective international institutions (the World Trade 
Organization, the IMF, and the international 
network of regulatory agencies) failed to meet. 
(Zaring, 2010: 475) 
Global financial crisis demonstrated that 
nations are still the most important actors of the 
international financial system. It was also clearly 
seen that G-7 countries cannot decide on global 
economic issues themselves; representation and 
participation of emerging countries in the decision-
taking mechanisms is needed. The crisis moved the 
center of gravity of the international economy 
towards emerging countries and the G-20 emerged 
as the legitimate platform to restructure the 
international financial architecture in terms of 
representation, international reserves and economic 
power. (Bradford, 2009: 38) The G-20 countries 
together represent over 85 percent of world GDP, 
80 percent of world trade, and two-thirds of the 
world’s population. (Beeson and Bell, 2009:68) In 
this connection, creation of the G-20 increases the 
possibility of effective policy coordination and 
increase the credibility and legitimacy. (Germain, 
2001) 
The global crisis also showed that the 
international financial system has expanded greatly 
in size, reach and liquidity and gained the potential 
to drag not only the developing but also the 
developed countries into crisis. (Wade, 2008) Even 
if the international institutional framework for 
international finance is seen as the most 
sophisticated of the global governance regimes 
(Kerwer, 2005), the crisis showed that the systemic 
complexities of the 21st century networks should be 
better understood. (Schweitzer et al., 2009) The 
international financial system has become so 
integrated and the global economy so 
interdependent that policy coordination at the global 
level is needed and to do that, international 
institutions must be reformed in a way that gives 
greater voice and representation to the emerging 
countries. (Pisani-Ferry and Santos, 2009:12) 
According to the IMF study (2009), 
synchronized recessions after financial crises tend 
to be deeper and last longer, which makes 
coordinated action and cooperation at the global 
level more urgent. As a result, the global 
governance concept, which is related to the 
emerging urgent global problems that cannot be 
solved by the national instruments of decision 
making, (Potucek, 2009: 12) is pronounced more 
and more frequently. It is argued that a 
comprehensive supervisory and regulatory regime 
that monitors and assess systemic financial risks 
stemming from the poor corporate governance, risk-
management and management of liquidity risk of all 
the banks and the shadow financial system should 
be constructed. Absence of binding international 
standards to enhance financial transparency and 
accountability (Abdelal, 2007) is seen as one of the 
most important factors that intensified the global 
financial crisis.  
It is argued that financial deregulation 
reforms, which opened up countries to the free flow 
of capital in and out of them, removed the 
regulations on financial institutions operating within 
countries, and removed the political controls from 
the Central Bank, made the financial sectors of 
nations parts of the international financial sector 
and increased countries’ vulnerabilities. (Beder, 
2009: 18) Nonetheless, there are also views that 
worldwide drive to regulation is misconceived. 
(Connolly, 2009:422)  
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Even if the need for cooperation at the 
global level was clearly recognized, it was also seen 
that states are not ready for a global financial 
regulator and a central bank. In spite of the fact that 
a supranational regulator and international lender of 
last resort may be functional to stabilize 
international financial markets, it is also accepted 
that it is not easy to establish these institutions 
under current circumstances. So, until these kinds of 
supranational institutions are established, 
intensifying national regulations, enhancing 
international cooperation and redesigning the 
regulatory framework at the national and 
international levels are seen as short and middle-
term options. It is expected that IMF will continue 
to play the role of “quasi-lender of last resort”. 
III. THE G-20 SUMMITS, 
INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS AND THE 
RESTRUCTURING 
PROCESS 
As the global crisis deepened in the first 
quarter of 2009, need for cooperation at the global 
level was clearly understood. Nevertheless, 
developed and developing countries, with different 
points of view about the restructuring process, tried 
to shape the process according to their interests. The 
restructuring process turned into a political dispute 
among the developed and developing countries. 
G-20 meetings symbolized the changing 
balance of power in the international economy. 
(Bradford, 2009:38) Prior to the crisis, the G-7 
summits were platforms where the most important 
decisions about the international economic order 
were taken. Nonetheless, the global financial crisis 
necessitated more participation and representation 
of the developing countries. G-20 reflected the 
structural shifts in the system hereby power 
balances are being altered by the rise of emerging 
countries, particularly the BRIC countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China). (Armijo, 2007) “The 
BRIC countries” concept gained a political meaning 
rather than a just economic term. Putin had 
mentioned this in his Munich speech in 2007: 
“There is no reason to doubt that the economic 
potential of the new centers of global economic 
growth (the BRICs) will inevitably be converted 
into political influence and will strengthen 
multipolarity” (Lukyanov, 2009:130) 
G-20 is seen as an important step towards a 
reformed global economic governance regime. 
(Schmidt et al., 2009) Nonetheless, it is also argued 
that since G-20 is merely a gathering of national 
leaders, not a formally constituted international 
organization and lacks the capacity to enforce its 
decisions, it does not result in any fundamental 
changes to the system. (Buckley, 2010) G-20 is 
likened to a non executive board of directors for the 
global system of governance than an executive 
management committee. (Garrett, 2010: 38) G-20 
declarations are also criticized on the basis that no 
preconditions are defined for more cooperation and 
no underlying principles are defined. (Graaf and 
Williams, 2009: 414)  
During the initial phases of the crisis, in 
November 2008, the G-20 countries convened with 
the agenda of taking measures to prevent the 
deepening of the crisis. G-20 countries convened 
again in April 2009 and took important decisions. 
Finally, at the G-20 meeting in September 2009, the 
leaders declared that the G-20 became the main 
platform for international economic cooperation. 
 G-20 meeting in April 2009 was 
successful at some extent. Nonetheless, the meeting 
failed to reform the international financial system 
because of clash of interests among the Anglo-
Saxons, the Europeans and the emerging countries. 
It is argued that the US blocked the reform of the 
international financial system and pushed for global 
fiscal stimulus. The Europeans resisted fiscal 
stimulus and reform of the IMF and the World Bank 
since their voting power would be cut to create 
space for the emerging countries. They shifted the 
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focus from these issues to the regulatory reforms. 
Meanwhile, emerging countries, particularly BRIC 
countries stressed the importance of the reform of 
the international financial and monetary system. 
At the end of the summit, it was declared that 
IMF’s financial resources were increased threefold 
to $750 billion, which was seen useful to help 
stabilize financial sector in troubled regions of the 
world. (Yunus, 2009:7) Nonetheless, most of this 
amount consisted of commitments. Only Japan 
signed a $100 billion bilateral barrowing agreement 
with the IMF. The E.U. and the U.S. committed 
$100 billion. China pledged to buy $50 billion IMF 
bonds denominated in SDRs. Russia, Brazil, South 
Korea and India also pledged to buy $10 billion 
IMF bonds. Canada and Switzerland also 
committed $10 billion dollar. Adding commitments 
of other countries, the total amount amounted to 
423 billion dollars by early September. The 
European Union increased its commitments by 78 
billion dollars in September 2009 and in this way 
the $500 billion target could be reached before the 
G-20 summit at the end of the September. 
The G-20 meeting in April 2009 was not 
successful especially from developing countries’ 
perspectives in terms of reform of the international 
financial system. Russia voiced its concerns with 
regards to the problems caused by the dominance of 
dollar and China, which is expected to provide more 
resources to the IMF, proposed the reform of the 
international financial system with specific 
suggestions; nonetheless G-7 countries simply 
ignored. (Stewart, 2009) It is argued  China pledged 
to buy only $50 billion IMF bond  rather than 
giving long-term loan to give a massage that it 
wants faster reforms in decision-making 
mechanisms of the IMF. (The Economist, 2009: 79) 
Other BRIC countries also refused to participate in 
the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) or special 
arrangements, rather offered to purchase IMF 
bonds. (Woods, 
 2010: 59) Even if fundamental reforms such as the 
rearrangement the quota system was postponed, 
some substantial changes were made such as 
trebling of IMF’s financial resources to $750 
billion, a $250 billion dollar increase in the Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR), a new facility called 
Flexible Credit Line (FCL), a change of 
conditionality that would let barrower countries to 
keep up social spending during crises, a doubling of 
the limit on the total amount each member country 
can barrow, softening of the core conditionality, 
better surveillance of risks created by individual 
countries to the international financial system, a 
change in the selection of managing directors 
towards merit-based process. (Weissman, 2009:11) 
Grabel (2010: 12) argues that G-20 representatives 
gave the IMF pride of place in global efforts to 
respond to the crisis. The G-20 countries also 
agreed to reshape regulatory systems, to extend 
regulation and oversight to all systemically 
important financial institutions, instruments and 
markets. They decided to strengthen international 
cooperation by establishing the remaining 
supervisory colleges for significant cross-border 
firms by June 2009, building in the 28 already in 
place; by implementing the FSF principles for 
cross-border crisis management immediately. 
Members of the IMF met at the annual 
IMF meeting in the last week of April and discussed 
how they will raise the funds that were agreed upon 
at the G-20 summit. They also discussed the reform 
of the decisionmaking mechanisms of the IMF and 
the World Bank. Developing countries were not 
convinced that IMF’s more powerful countries were 
serious about ceding any control. They warned that 
they would not provide financial resources without 
having more voice in the decision-making process. 
(Prosser, 2009) 
Alexei Kudrin, Russia’s finance minister, 
said at the meeting that, “we already meet a cool 
attitude and even resistance to reform the IMF. The 
leading countries are not in a hurry… this was the 
main discussion, the nerve of the meeting.” 
Brazilian finance minister stated that contributions 
made by the developing countries would be 
provisional, meaning that they may be withdrawn if 
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the IMF’s decision-making process is not reformed. 
From the initial phases of the global crisis, BRIC 
countries tried to increase their influence in the 
restructuring process. In March 2009, before the G-
20 summit, BRIC countries came together and 
issued their first communiqué. In this communiqué, 
they called attention to the reform of the 
international financial institutions. Taking into 
consideration the growing weights of the emerging 
countries in the global economy, they wanted 
reconsideration of the quotas and voting rights of 
the IMF and the World Bank. They wanted the 
reform of the international monetary system. BRIC 
countries came together again in June and issued 
another communiqué. Similar to their March 
communiqué, they called for the reform of the 
international financial and monetary system. They 
called for a more diversified monetary system. They 
also called for a multipolar international system 
based on international law, equality, mutual respect, 
cooperation, coordinated action and collective 
decision-making principles. On June 29, 2009, the 
United Nations ratified an action plan about the 
international financial system, according to which 
the member countries demanded an immediate 
reform of the Bretton Woods institutions. 
BRIC countries continued to criticize the 
international financial and monetary architecture at 
other platforms. At the G-8 summit held in July, 
China repeated its demand for a rational and more 
diversified international monetary system. Russia 
also argued that an alternative global reserve 
currency should be included in the agenda of the G-
8 summit. 
The United Nations Trade and 
Development Conference supported BRIC 
countries’ arguments about the international 
financial and monetary system with a report in 
September. (UNCTAD, 2009:10-13) According to 
arguments in report, dollar should be replaced with 
another international reserve currency issued by an 
international organization. It was argued that 
restructuring of the international financial system in 
this way would eliminate the problem of instability 
creating capital movements and would decrease 
speculation. The report specifically emphasized the 
SDR. It was argued that the SDRs could function as 
supranational reserve currency. Meanwhile, some 
scholars argue that since the purchasing power of 
the SDRs is uncertain and since their liquidity is 
relatively insufficient, they are not suitable for 
countries with balance of payments surplus. 
(McKinnon, 2009:7) 
Finance ministers of the BRIC countries 
came together in September before the G-20 
summit issued a declaration and reiterated their 
demands about the reform of the international 
financial and monetary system. 
They stated that the most serious problem 
that damages the legitimacy of the IMF and the 
World Bank is unjust distribution of quotas and 
voting rights. They demanded a seven percent quota 
shift from developed countries to developing 
countries in the IMF and a six percent voting rights 
shift in the World Bank. They called for a more 
stable and predictable monetary system. They also 
demanded a transparent selection process for the 
IMF and World Bank Presidents based on the merit, 
not on the nationality. 
G-20 summit in September has been a 
summit, which concrete results emerged from 
ongoing negotiations and discussions among the 
developing and developed countries in different 
platforms since the beginning of the global crisis. 
The leaders declared that the G-20 has become the 
main platform of international economic 
cooperation. 
Developing countries’, particularly BRIC 
countries’ demands for the reform of the 
international monetary and financial system were 
met at some extent. At the G-20 summit, a shift of 
five percent quota shares from overrepresented 
developed countries to underrepresented developing 
countries in the IMF and three percent voting rights 
shift in the World Bank were agreed upon. 
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Other important decisions about the 
international financial system were also taken. The 
G-20 leaders agreed to launch framework for 
strong, sustainable, and balanced growth. They 
agreed to address critical issues such as the size and 
composition of the Executive Board and ways of 
enhancing its effectiveness, the Fund Governors’ 
involvement in the strategic oversight of the IMF, 
enhancing staff diversity and making the 
appointments of the heads and senior leadership of 
all international institutions through a transparent 
and merit-based process. 
The G-20 also agreed to reconsider the 
regulation system for banks and other financial 
institutions in a way that prevents excesses that lead 
to financial crisis, to improve international 
standards for bank capital, to make necessary 
arrangements about compensation to end practices 
that lead to excessive risk-taking, to make the over-
the-counter (OTC) derivatives more transparent, to 
regulate and supervise the hedge funds and credit 
rating agencies, and to make the regulatory and 
supervisory arrangements for the systematically  
important international financial institutions. 
At the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings 
held in Istanbul in October 2009, decisions that 
support and complement the decisions taken at the 
G-20 summit were taken. These “Istanbul 
Decisions” include: 
1. Enlarging the mandate of the IMF in a 
way that includes all macroeconomic and financial 
policies, which affect the global stability. 
2. Providing insurance to more countries as 
the lender of last resort by using Flexible Credit 
Line. 
3. To expand the multilateral surveillance 
authority of the IMF.  
4. To shift a quota share of at least five 
percent from developed countries to developing 
countries. 
IV. RESTRUCTURING THE 
GOVERNANCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
Confidence to the international financial 
system diminished significantly as a result of the 
global financial crisis. It is argued that transparency 
and public accountability of international financial 
institutions and new complex financial instruments 
should be augmented to reestablish confidence to 
the financial system. (Porter, 2009:8) 
Since the world is not ready for a brand-
new global financial regulator or a central bank 
after the global crisis, it is estimated that the global 
financial crisis will possibly lead to the 
restructuring of the international financial system in 
a way that enhances IMF’s role in the global 
economy. The decision to increase IMF’s financial 
resources at the G-20 meeting in April 2009 reflects 
increasing importance of the IMF. 
IMF’s role was being discussed 
extensively before the crisis. The Fund was 
searching for a way to stay in business. (Weissman, 
2009:11) The Fund had cut staff by about 13 
percent but still faced a $300 million deficit over 
the next four years in 2008. (Griesgraber, 2009: 
179) There were few countries that had signed 
stand-by agreements with the IMF in 2000s and it 
was argued that the Fund could not even find 
money for its day-to-day activities. Bank of 
England Governor Mervyn King (2006) had said 
this:”The Fund’s remit is unclear. Its lending 
activities have waned and its role in the 
international monetary system is obscure.” 
The global crisis changed international 
economic prospect for the IMF fundamentally. It 
rescued the institution from its increasing 
irrelevance. (Chorev and Babb, 2009) Nonetheless, 
to be a legitimate and effective institution, it is 
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argued that reforms must be implemented in four 
main areas including governance, economic 
philosophy, IMF staff competencies and substantial 
increase in financing. (Griesgraber, 2009: 180- 183) 
The other institution that will probably 
gain importance is the Financial Stability Forum. 
The FSF was transformed at the G-20 meeting in 
April 2009 into the Financial Stability Board. The 
G20 placed the FSB at the centre of intensified 
regulatory cooperation. (Arner and Taylor, 2009: 
489) It includes all G20 countries, FSF members, 
Spain and the European Commission. The FSB will 
collaborate with the IMF to provide early warning 
of macroeconomic and financial risks and the 
actions needed to address them. Financial Stability 
Board was given important roles with regards to the 
international financial system such as: 
1) Assessing the weak points of the 
financial system and identifying the steps to address 
them. Facilitating and enhancing co-ordination 
among the authorities responsible for the financial 
stability. 
2) Providing the regulatory policy 
recommendations about the market developments 
and their implications. 
3) Monitoring and assessing the practice of 
regulatory standards. Monitoring the policy 
development work of International Standard Setting 
Bodies and ensuring that their work is coordinated 
and focused on priorities and addressing gaps. 
4) Promoting contingency planning for 
cross-border systemic crisis management. 
Conducting Early Warning Exercises in 
collaboration with IMF to identify the buildup of 
macroeconomic and financial risks. 
5) Establishing a supervisory college to 
monitor the systematically important international 
financial firms Overseeing all systemically 
important financial institutions, instruments and 
markets including the hedge funds, which will have 
to register and report their strategy, debt and risk 
levels. 
6) Establishing a clearing house, through 
which credit derivatives, whose value is derived 
from an underlying asset, will be cleared. 
It is expected that FSB will have an 
important role in the restructuring process of the 
international financial system and will function like 
a global financial regulator. 
Decision-making mechanisms of the 
international financial institutions such as IMF and 
World Bank are among the most critical and 
controversial issues of the restructuring process. 
Developing countries demand larger quota shares 
and voting rights arguing that they are under-
represented. 
The U.S. has 17,09 percent quota share in 
the IMF. This gives the US the veto power over 
crucial decisions since a majority of 85 percent is 
required. The European Union countries have 32,09 
percent quota share while China has 3,72 percent, 
Russia 2,73 percent, India 1,91 percent and Brazil 
1,4 percent. According to experts, the recalculating 
quota is very slow because of political dynamics. It 
took very long negotiations for China to be awarded 
a “special” quota increase when it reabsorbed Hong 
Kong. In 2008, Board of Governors agreed to a 
process of change of quotas in small magnitudes. 
According to the agreement, US’s quotas would 
eventually reduce to 16,73 percent, while China’s 
quota would increase to 3,81, India’s to 2,34 and 
Russia’s to 2,39. 
Especially in recent decades, there has 
been a shift in the international economic balance of 
power towards east. This shift was not reflected in 
the quota shares and the voting rights of the IMF 
and the World Bank, which limited China’s 
contribution to the new financial resources for the 
IMF. It is argued that China has pledged to buy only 
$50 billion IMF bonds since its calls for greater 
representation were not met. It is also argued that 
China preferred to buy IMF bonds rather than 
providing long-term financial sources to IMF to 
show that it wants acceleration of the restructuring 
process of decision-taking mechanisms of the IMF 
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and the World Bank. (The Economist, 2009: 79) In 
this connection, an expanded role for China in 
multilateral financial institutions is seen helpful for 
China’s cooperation with regards to the global 
financial crisis. (Prasad, 2009:233) 
 IMF’s functions were determined in the 
Bretton Woods Articles of Agreement in 1944 and 
they were in harmony with the post-war conditions 
and with the preferences of the politically strongest 
countries, the US and the UK. (Helleiner, 2009b: 
191) Its functions started to change in 1970s with 
the transformation of the international financial 
system. The US suspended the convertibility of the 
dollar to gold and the Bretton Woods system 
collapsed. Technological developments, increasing 
mobility of capital, financial liberalization and 
deregulation gave the capital movements the 
potential to drag countries into financial instabilities 
and crises. IMF’s main function transformed from 
providing balance of payments support to liquidity 
crisis management. IMF signed agreements with 
many countries most of which were not successful. 
It was particularly criticized for its policies after the 
Asian crises in 1997-98. In the first years of the 21st 
century, IMF’s role seemed to diminish as less and 
less countries signed agreements with IMF. 
The global financial crisis changed this 
picture totally. IMF became almost the most 
important international institution of the 
international economy. IMF’s financial resources 
were increased to $750 billion. New facilities such 
as Short-term Liquidity Facility (SLF), which 
provide more flexibility, were created. With Short-
Term Liquidity Facility (SLF), IMF will be able to 
channel funds quickly to eligible emerging markets 
with sound policies and sustainable debt burdens. It 
is expected that as IMF’s effectiveness and 
influence in the international economy increase, 
reform of its decision-taking mechanism will be a 
more important issue. Appointment process of the 
IMF and World Bank Presidents is criticized. It is 
argued that the IMF and World Bank Presidents are 
selected according to an informal agreement among 
the U.S. and the West European countries and as a 
consequence, all of the ten IMF Presidents since the 
establishment of both institutions were West 
European nationals while all of the eleven World 
Bank Presidents were U.S. nationals. (Cogan, 2009: 
209) 
A critical issue with regards to the 
governance of IMF is the degree of control of the 
staff and management by the Executive Board. 
There may sometimes be conflicts of interest 
between the staff focusing on global public goods 
and the Executive Board that is controlled 
politically by member states, particularly ones with 
the larger quotas. It is argued that if there is no 
change in the structure of the executive board, the 
Fund’s effectiveness in providing a high-level 
forum for international economic cooperation will 
decrease. (Thimann, Just and Ritter, 2009: 188) 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The global financial crisis demonstrated that 
the international financial architecture has structural 
flaws. From the beginning of the crisis, debates and 
negotiations about restructuring of the international 
financial system and the governance of the 
international financial institutions continued in 
different platforms. Since the international financial 
system is a complex system which consists of 
various institutions, rules and regulations; it is 
expected that the restructuring process will be a 
slow process. 
Apart from the difficulties of the restructuring 
process stemming from economic factors and the 
complexity of the international financial system, 
there are also political dynamics that affect, slow 
down and harden the process. Developing and 
developed countries have different perspectives and 
different political concerns about the governance 
structures of international financial institutions. 
Developing countries want the reform of the 
decision-making mechanisms of the IMF and World 
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Bank in a way that increases the quota shares and 
voting rights of the developing countries.  
Negotiations and debates among the 
developed countries, particularly the G-7 countries 
and the developing countries, particularly the BRIC 
countries continued in different platforms since the 
beginning of the global financial crisis. Political 
agendas shaped the restructuring process as much as 
the economic concerns. The result was that along 
with the regulatory reforms, reforms about the 
decision-making process of the IMF and the World 
Bank were made in a way that gives more voice to 
the developing countries in the international 
financial institutions. 
It is expected that developed countries will try 
to slow down the restructuring process since their 
control on the decision-making processes of the 
IMF and the World Bank provides them various 
economic and political advantages. Nonetheless, 
since they also recognize that international 
economic balance of power has changed in recent 
decades, they may accept some transfer of control. 
Decisions taken at the G-20 summit in September 
2009, according to which IMF quota shares and 
World Bank voting rights will be transferred from 
developed countries to developing countries, can be 
seen as a first step towards greater role of 
developing countries in the international financial 
system. 
Meanwhile, the developing countries, 
particularly the BRIC countries, will probably press 
for faster reforms in the decision-taking 
mechanisms of the IMF and the World Bank. They 
will try to increase the amount of IMF quota shares 
and the World Bank voting rights that will be 
transferred to them. It is anticipated that the 
restructuring process will proceed slowly because of 
the complex relations between the international 
financial system and the international politics. 
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